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Abstract Different theories have been developed, mainly in the context of the
United States, to explain judicial decision-making. In this respect, there is an
important ongoing debate over whether judges are guided by the law or by personal
ideology. The analysis of the decision-making in the Polish Constitutional Tribunal
seems to support the existence of some party alignment. It is to say that judicial
behavior is influenced by the ideology, either because judges’ preferences coincide
with the interests of a specific party or because the judges are incentivized to show
their loyalty to a party. Party alignment exists but subject to institutional influences.
These results are in line with previous findings for other constitutional courts in
Europe.
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1 Introduction
Judicial behavior in any court around the world can be conceptually explained by
the same determinants even though they might vary in degree. They include
individual preferences, intra-court interaction and the influence of other relevant
actors, including the political branches of government and the general public. It is
the exact mix of these three factors that divides academics and varies across
jurisdictions.
As one of the authors has explained in a previous paper (Garoupa et al. 2011a, b),
judicial preferences refer to personal attributes and attitudes in respect to cases to be
adjudicated, case law more generally and possible legal policy implications.1 Intra-
court interaction captures the collegiality of judicial decision-making; judges cannot
impose their own preferences insulated from other judges. They have to weigh their
individual preferences (their disposition towards a particular outcome) and their
influence on the decisions of the court (their ability to shape the outcome in terms of
public policy) (Kornhauser 1992; 2003, Cameron and Kornhauser 2010). At the
same time, judges also take into account the interests of external audiences; in
particular, those that react more directly to judicial decisions (see generally Garoupa
and Ginsburg 2010). They might be worried about exhibiting loyalty to the
appointer (given the prospect of a future career under political patronage or mere
gratitude). The possible reactions of the executive and legislative branches are likely
to be anticipated by the judiciary and influence their decisions; judges do not want
to see their power undermined by the other branches of government. The positive or
negative perception by the general public might also be of significance to individual
judges and collectively to the court or the group more broadly.
Different theories have been developed, mainly in the context of the United
States, to explain judicial decision-making. In this respect, there is an important
ongoing debate over whether judges are guided by the law or by personal ideology.
Formalists take the stance that judges simply interpret and apply the constitution
and the law in a conformist view of precedents. Judges are largely guided by what
the law says and abide by a strict legal authoritative interpretation. Under a
completely different perspective, the attitudinal model sees judicial preferences,
with special emphasis on ideology, as the main explanatory model. Finally, agency
or strategy theorists recognize the importance of judicial preferences but argue that
they are implemented taking into account political and institutional realities.2
These different theories of judicial behavior cannot be convincingly addressed
without an adequate empirical assessment. Legal scholars and political scientists
have focused much empirical attention on the U.S. Supreme Court. Empirical
1 For judicial preferences, see Posner (1993, 2005, 2010, 2011). For a defence of the formalist view,
criticizing the empirical studies showing the presence of political influence in judicial decision-making,
see Edwards and Livermore (2009). For other views, see Robertson (1998, 2010).
2 For discussion and references therein, see Epstein and Knight (1998), Segal and Spaeth (2002), and
Spiller et al. (2007).
An empirical analysis of constitutional review voting in… 67
123
debate about other higher courts is an emerging literature, with notable applications
in Europe and North America,3 in Asia4 and in Latin America.5
This paper contributes to the empirical literature on judicial behavior by looking
at constitutional review in Poland. The creation and the major reforms of judicial
review in Poland coincide with a transition from the socialist regime to democracy.
After Former Yugoslavia, in 1985, Poland was the second socialist country to
establish a constitutional court (Trybunał Konstytucyjny, hereinafter TK) with an
exclusive right to review laws for their conformity with the (then socialist)
Constitution (Sadurski 2002). In spite of its limited powers (e.g. the court could
review the legislation passed only after its promulgation and the Court decisions
were legally inconclusive), the TK managed to develop valuable case law even in its
first years of existence under the then still prevailing socialist system (Garlicki
2002; Stawecki et al. 2008). Yet, more significant jurisprudence, on which TK
managed to build its strong reputation, was developed shortly after the fall of the
socialism regime in 1989. The TK legal doctrines were particularly crucial in filling
the constitutional gaps of the early transitional period. It is of note that until 1997
Poland was operating under the old Stalinist Constitution of 1952, which was of
limited relevance in the freshly-restored democratic regime.6 The importance of the
TK legal doctrines was reflected in the new Constitution of 1997, which was largely
grounded on the principles and rules designed by the Court at the outset of the
transition (see Garlicki 2002; Stawecki et al. 2008). However, one should emphasize
that the new Constitution of 1997 constitutes an important breakthrough in the
history of the TK itself. Specifically, the Constitution brought many reforms with
regard to the TK organization and strengthened its position vis-a`-vis the legislature.
The contributions of the TK to the process of governing the political
transformation of Poland and its current strong position within the Polish public
institutions are unquestionable. However, as it is often raised in the debates over the
TK, one point of concern is the potential ideological bias and party allegiance of the
constitutional judges. In Poland, the nominations to the Court are exclusively vested
3 On Canada, see Tate and Sittiwong (1989), Alarie and Green (2008), Green and Alarie (2009), and
Songer et al. (2011). On Germany, see Schneider (2005) and Vanberg (2005). On Italy, see Breton and
Fraschini (2003), Fiorino et al. (2007, 2015), Padovano (2009), Pellegrina and Garoupa (2013), and
Garoupa and Grembi (2015). On Portugal, see Amaral Garcia et al. (2009). On France, see Franck (2009,
2010). On Spain, see Garoupa et al. (2013). On Israel, see Shachar et al. (1997) and Eisenberg et al.
(2012). On Australia, see Smyth and Narayan (2004).
4 On Japan, see Ramseyer and Rasmusen (2003), and in particular on the Japanese Supreme Court, see
Ramseyer and Rasmusen (2006). On Taiwan, see Ginsburg (2003) and Garoupa et al. (2011a, b). On the
Phillipines, see Escresa et al. (2012).
5 On Argentina, see Cha´vez (2004) and Helmke (2004) as well as Iaryczower et al. (2002, 2006). On
Chile, see Hilbink (2007) and Carroll and Tiede (2011). On Brazil, see Arlota and Garoupa (2014). More
generally, see Kapiszewski and Taylor (2008).
6 It is important to stress that in 1992 the interim Little Constitution was promulgated in Poland. This
Constitution did not repeal all of the rules of the Stalinist Constitution of 1952. It aimed, however, at
reducing institutional uncertainty through amending and facilitating the main functional and organiza-
tional features of the state. The most important was to bring order and regularity to the confused relations
between the parliament, the government and the President. Among the hottest issues, the interim
Constitution was supposed to remove dual authority over foreign affairs and security matters as well as
clarify the process for appointing the Prime Minister (see, for instance, Elster 1993).
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upon the Sejm, i.e. the lower chamber of the Parliament. As a partisan body, the
Sejm perceives the nominations to the TK as important political decisions possibly
assuring that judges elected to the Court have congruent policy preferences with the
occasional parliamentary majority. This largely politicized process of appointments
can potentially endanger the impartiality of the court. Judges nominated by the
partisan bodies instead of being of the highest merits and subject exclusively to the
law might be too easy driven by individual ideologies and party’s interests in
adjudicating specific cases. They might be further incentivized to cast ideological
votes while hoping for future appointment to other public offices since constitu-
tional judges in Poland do not serve for lifetime, but for a fixed term of 9 years after
the 1997 changes. In addition, on many occasions, judges are obliged to adjudicate
in cases where ideological differences are large and political stakes are significant.
The reason for this is that a wide range of partisan bodies can initiate judicial review
before the Court in an abstract form (that is, outside of a concrete case).
Not surprisingly, the conjecture of this paper is that the Polish constitutional
court is politicized and ideology plays a role in judicial voting. It should be clarified
that this study is empirically interested in the mere documentation of an ideological
bias; our dataset does not disentangle strategic ideological voting (incentives) from
sincere ideological voting (preferences). More significantly, to the authors’
knowledge, this article is a first attempt of studying judicial behavior in the Polish
TK. The results presented in the paper confirm the hypothesis that judges’ decisions
might be driven by their ideologies, thus convincingly refuting the conventional
formalist account of judicial behavior prevalent in civil law academic scholarship.
Those results hold particularly for judges chosen by the most ideologically polarized
political camps, such as the left and extreme right parties. It is to stress, however,
that the pure attitudinal model (the version that takes dispositional preferences in
explaining judicial behavior as the only determinant) might not be entirely correct.
Thus, also the institutional realities of the Polish TK are recognized in driving the
behavior of the constitutional judges.
The paper goes as follows. An overview of the constitutional review in Poland is
presented in Sect. 2. Section 3 illustrates potential sources of the ideological bias in
the TK. Data and empirical strategy follows in Sect. 4. A preliminary quantitative
analysis is introduced and discussed in Sect. 5. Regression analysis is discussed in
Sect. 6. Finally, Sect. 7 concludes the paper.
2 The case of Poland
The Polish Constitution of 1997 was the result of the long-lasting political
bargaining and log-rolling. Although the Constitutional Assembly (responsible for
drafting the new constitution) was largely dominated by the left leaning parties,
some conservative ideas were embedded in order to guarantee a more widespread
political support for the constitution.7 Overall, it took almost 5 years for the
7 For instance, the constitutional drafters introduced an innovative fiscal rule limiting the country’s debt
ratio to 60 % of GDP.
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Assembly to accomplish the drafting of the document, which is exceptionally long
as compared to the average constitutional deliberation of 16 months (Ginsburg et al.
2009). Delays in drafting the constitution resulted in loss of the constitutional
momentum. Consequently, the final draft of the constitution was approved in
referendum by only a slight majority of 52.7 %. Moreover, the voting turnout was
low since it did not reach 50 % of the eligible voters.8
Albeit some opposition against strengthening the institutional locus of the TK
was present, the Constitution of 1997 significantly reinforced the position of the TK
vis-a`-vis the legislative body of the state. The establishment of the TK in 1985 under
the non-democratic regime (keep in mind that socialism in Poland collapsed only in
1989) resulted in highly restrained powers for the Court as compared to its Western
counterparts. Most importantly, the decisions of the court were not final. The
judgments on unconformity of the law with the constitution were subject to a
possible later consideration by the Sejm, which could reject the TK decisions by 2/3
majority. The new Constitution of 1997 and the Constitutional Court Act of 1997,
i.e. two basic laws shaping the modern TK, banned this provision. Ultimately, after
2 years of transitory period, effectively in October 1999, the decisions of the TK
started being final, conclusive in character, and not subject to further appeals. Under
the currently binding procedures, whenever the Court adjudicates the unconstitu-
tionality of a particular law, the challenged statute or its relevant articles become
null and void. Unless it is formulated differently, the unconstitutional provisions
cease to have binding legal effect at the moment of announcing the judgment.9 In
some cases where the unconstitutionality of the law imposes a high burden on the
state budget or the law annulment results in a legal uncertainty, the Court allows a
temporary preservation of the statute (up to 18 months).
Before the reforms of 1997, the Court was composed of 12 judges, who were
elected for a non-renewable term of 8 years. The new Constitution of 1997
increased the number of judges to 15 and lengthened their term to 9 years. With
respect to the nominations and appointments of the judges, the regulations before
and after the 1997 reform remained almost untouched although a major change
concerned the appointment of the President and Vice-President of the Court. The
candidates to the TK are put forward by a group of minimum 50 deputies sitting in
8 Although the Referendum Act of 1995 required at least 50 % turnout for a referendum to have a biding
effect, the Constitutional Act of 1992 instructed that the new constitution should be adopted in a
referendum regardless of the turnout rate. The common belief in the early 1990s was that the turnout in
the constitutional referendum would never achieve 50 %. Therefore, the establishment of a 50 % turnout
threshold put the constitutional project at high risk (see, for instance, Supreme Court Resolution from July
15, 1997).
9 Although according to the law, the unconstitutional statutes or articles cease to have any effective
binding legal status, it is important to note that on many occasions the legislative bodies are obliged to
further enforce specific TK judgments. It is particularly the case when the TK derogates the law and
creates a legal vacuum. In years 2005–2008, approximately 70 % (112/160) of judgments posed some
enforcement obligation on the legislative bodies. However, 47 % (52/112) of those judgments were not
enforced by the relevant institutions (see Radzewicz 2010).
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the Sejm or the Presidium of the Sejm.10 From those candidates, the Sejm elects the
judges to the TK by an absolute majority of votes with no less than half of the
deputies present. As a consequence of this procedure, the majority in the Sejm can
largely influence the elections of the constitutional judges, and give precedence to
the candidates of their preference. It is to stress that unlike the judicial appointment
mechanism in Germany, Italy, Portugal, or Spain, a de facto quota system does not
exist in Poland (that is, there is no stable arrangement of allocating seats to the
political parties). Therefore, at different point in time, changing political majorities
are reflected in appointments to the TK.
Against this backdrop, it is important to note that there are several mechanisms
formally entrenched in the law to secure judges’ independence. First, judges are
irremovable from office,11 protected by the immunity and entitled to a permanent
salary. Second, judges to the Court must not belong to any political party or a trade
union, nor hold high public offices. However, past political activism does not
exclude possible candidates from being appointed to the Court. Third, as already
mentioned, judges are not allowed to be re-elected for the following terms. After
terminating the duties at the court, they can retain the status of a judge12 or continue
their academic careers, provided that they were university professors prior to the
appointment. It is to underscore that former judges of the TK are not deprived from
serving other state functions after finishing the term in the TK. In those cases,
however, they cannot retain the status of the judge.
The Tribunal is headed by its President and Vice-President. Until 1997, these
bodies were elected by the Sejm therefore making the Court even more reliant on
partisan choices. The new regulations of 1997 abolished this provision and
introduced a mechanism where the President and Vice-President of the TK are
appointed by the President of the Republic. However, in his decision, the President
of the Republic is constrained to only two candidates who are recommended by the
Court and are chosen from its members.
Yet, another important change in 1997 concerned the prerogatives of the
President of the TK. First, the President lost the privilege to decide which judge
would be a rapporteur of the pending case13 and was deprived of the right to
determine the composition of the benches assigned to adjudicate in individual cases.
It is of note that some cases, particularly those which are not excessively
complicated and do not concern the ex ante preventive review mechanism, are
10 The Presidium of the Sejm comprises the President and Deputy President of the Sejm. The main
competence of the Presidium of the Sejm includes the setting of the Sejm’s work agenda, organizing
cooperation between the committees of the Sejm and coordinating their activities.
11 Removal from the office of the judge can be only a consequence of the disciplinary punishment by the
TK. A judge may be subject to the disciplinary punishment for an infringement of provisions of the law,
for act which is inconsistent with the dignity of his office or for unethical conduct which might undermine
judge’s confidence (see articles 8-10 of the Constitutional Tribunal Act of 1997).
12 Retention of a judicial status entitles the retiring judge to a ‘‘pension’’ irrespective of his/her age.
13 The rapporteur casts an important role in the adjudicating process since s/he is in charge of drafting the
judgment together with its reasoning (see § 42 of the Constitutional Court Statute of 2006).
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adjudicated in small benches of three or five judges.14 The existing law obliges the
President of the TK to assign the new cases to the judges in alphabetical order of
their surnames. The assignment of the judge rapporteur is accomplished in the same
manner. The second reform referred to the fact that the President’s vote was no
longer decisive in situations where the number of votes for and against a particular
judgment is equal. After the amendments of 1997, the law states explicitly that the
decisions by the TK are made by the majority of votes and no special role for the
President is defined.
As to the voting and decision-making by the TK, it is important to stress that
judges who disagree with the decision of the majority of the bench are allowed to
present dissenting opinions (votum separatum).15 The dissenting opinion can
concern the whole judgment or part of it. Judges are also allowed to present a
different opinion with respect to the reasoning of the judgment (concurring
opinions). Thus, judges may agree with the final decision of the bench but they
disagree about the argumentation of the majority of the bench.
In this article, the attention is exclusively given to abstract judicial review.16 In
this respect, a rather broad range of actors can initiate the petition: (i) the President
of the Republic, (ii) the President of the Sejm or the President of the Senate, (iii) the
Prime Minister, (iv) 50 deputies or 30 senators, (iv) the First President of the
Supreme Court, (v) the President of the Chief Administrative Court, (vi) the Public
Prosecutor-General, (vii) the President of the Supreme Chamber of Control, (viii)
the Commissioner for Citizens’ Rights (Ombudsmen), (ix) the National Council of
the Judiciary, (x) the constitutive bodies of local self-government, (xi) the national
bodies of trade unions as well as the national authorities of employers’ organizations
and occupational organizations, and (xii) churches and religious organizations.
While all those actors can file for ex post abstract review, it is to stress that
preventive (ex ante) abstract judicial review can be requested by the President of the
Republic only.
There is no doubt that the cases in which actors (i)–(iv) serve as petitioners are
mostly political in nature and where the political interests are easily identifiable. It is
often the case that the political opposition which failed to strike down a particular
legislation in the Parliament seeks to challenge it in the Tribunal. Those cases,
naturally, enjoy the largest media cover and political visibility.
14 The TK adjudicates in three types of benches, i.e. in a full bench (at least 9 judges), five-judges bench
and three-judges bench. The size of the adjudicating bench depends on the nature of the case and its
complexity (see article 25 of the Constitutional Court Act of 1997).
15 In 2012, 33 % of the Court decisions included at least one dissenting opinion. This is, however, the
record year. In previous years, the proportion of judgments with dissenting opinions is variable. It goes
from 3 % in 2006 to 29 % in 2011 (see Trybunał 2013).
16 An abstract review of law is not the only judicial review performed in the TK. Similarly to the U.S
model of judicial review, any court in Poland can initiate concrete review. This occurs in the situation
where the court has doubts about the constitutionality of legal provision which serves as a basis for the
judgment (see articles 31-44 of the Constitutional Court Act of 1997).
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3 Ideological bias at the Polish constitutional court
Since the approach taken in this paper is inspired by the attitudinal and strategic
models, it is argued that the Polish TK judges advance their ideological goals. More
precisely, given the potential arbitrariness in constitutional adjudication and
interpretation (a possible variant of judicial activism), judges rely on their
ideological preferences in voting one way or the other.
There are three main arguments which allow for a conjecture that the behavior of
the TK judges might be explained by such ideological bias. The first (and the main
attitudinal) reason concerns the appointment procedure to the court. As already
pointed out, the constitutional judges are elected to the TK through a mechanism
that heavily (if not entirely) relies on the political influence of the parliamentarian
majorities.17 An absolute majority of votes needed to appoint the judge by the Sejm
gives no incentives to the timely majorities to appoint individuals that differ
significantly from their policy preferences. The following numbers should be
illustrative. In years 1997–2012, 31 judges were appointed to the TK. From those,
29 judges were nominated by the groups belonging to the then governing majorities.
In most cases the opposition also proposed some candidates. However, they never
received the required majority. Consequently, the governing majorities, regardless
of their political position, largely assume that they do not have to share decisions
concerning appointments with the opposition (hence the inexistence of a quota
system). As this political behavior is common practice, it became increasingly
apparent that each change of political configuration of the Sejm is reflected in future
appointments. In addition, given the political importance of the Court (actual
extension of the legislative process), the parliamentary majorities have a clear
benefit being careful in the selection of the judges they appoint. They want to
minimize a mistake of appointing an individual with very different policy
preferences. It is therefore safe to presume that the preferences of the political
parties and those of appointed judges are strongly aligned. In other words, there
might be a sincere correlation of political and judicial preferences. Some
institutional safeguards such as comfortable retirement arrangements might
reinforce sincere voting.
The second argument supporting the conjecture of ideological bias of the judges
is based on the limited tenure at the court (recall that judges in Poland serve their
duties for 9 years only). Due to the limited tenure, the judges’ future career is not
entirely insulated from the influence of the political parties. One could think that
judges terminating their duties at the TK seek new appointments to other high level
occupations in the political sphere or they hope to play an important role in
17 The political dominance is not the only weakness of the appointment process to the TK. There are
several other problems. First, the short period of time given by the law to appoint the judges to the TK
(30 days) reduces the transparency of the process and practically eliminates the possibility for public
debate on the candidates. Second, the information about the candidates’ merits given by the nominating
bodies is very limited. It is often the case that the press investigation reveals some disgraceful facts about
the candidates to the TK. Thirdly, the judicial and academic circles are not invited to recommend the
candidates to the TK or to examine the merits of the candidates. Fourth, there is no fixed procedure for
electing the judges. Judges are appointed individually but on several occasions they were elected en banc
(voting on all candidates together) (see Bojarski 2010).
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consultancy of lawmaking in the future. At several occasions, former constitutional
judges indeed continued their careers by being nominated to other public positions.
For instance, after retiring from the TK, some judges were appointed as members of
the Monetary Policy Council at the National Bank of Poland and the State Election
Commission, as judges of the European Court of Justice and European Court of
Human Rights, as members of the Legislative Council in the Prime Minister Office,
as the President of the Chief Administrative Court and as Ombudsman.
At the same time, further strategic considerations could be relevant such as
reputational gains with the relevant audiences, perceived personalization of case
law, or enhancing academic prestige. All these factors might explain why
constitutional judges are expected to take into account political determinants in
strategic ways. Finally, the third argument to support the conjecture on ideological
bias is the fact that political actors challenge the laws through an abstract review,
thus without a direct relation to a specific concrete dispute. Unlike in the United
States, the most controversial cases in the Polish Court are filed by various political
actors since they are the key players in the access to abstract review. In those cases
where political actors challenge legislation, the Court has limited docket control.
Thus, constitutional judges in Poland have to decide on the constitutionality of
specific laws precisely because political bodies want to know the Court’s standpoint,
rather than providing a decision in spite of what political parties might want, like in
the United States. The consequence is that judges in the TK typically have to
adjudicate since there are heavy ideological differences and non-negligible political
interests at stake. One can expect therefore that, at least in these politicized cases,
the pattern of ideological voting should prevail.
On numerous occasions, the TK decided on cases in which ideological
differences and political stakes were significant. For instance, the TK was obliged
to adjudicate in vulnerable cases on lustration process (judgment K 2/07), pensions
of the former secret service agents (judgment K 6/09), relationship between the state
and the church (judgment K 3/09), financing of the catholic universities (judgment
K 55/07) and regulations of the credit unions (judgment Kp 10/09). Those cases had
straightforward political implications with distinct ideological consequences. The
current (in place since 2001) ideological division in Poland is, yet, more subtle than
the clear left–right fragmentation typical for the old democracies. Broadly speaking,
the Polish political stage can be divided into left of center (Sojusz Lewicy
Demokratycznej, hereinafter SLD), center (Platforma Obywatelska, hereinafter PO)
and extreme right (Prawo i Sprawiedliwos´c´, hereinafter PiS).18 Under this setting,
the largest ideological disparity should be observed between the left-wing SLD and
the anti-socialist extreme right-wing party PiS. Interestingly, however, one may
argue that this division does not hold in the social domain. Regarding welfare
aspects, the most conservative approach is taken by PO (center).
18 In the current parliamentary setting there are three other political parties present in the Sejm, i.e. Polish
People’s Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, hereinafter PSL), Palikot’s Movement (Two´j Ruch,
hereinafter TR) and United Poland (Solidarna Polska, hereinafter SP). PSL is currently the coalition
partner of the PO (centrist party). In years 1993–1997 and 2001–2003, however, this party was the
coalition junior partner of the left-wing governments. TP and SP, in turn, are relatively new parties on the
Polish political scene.
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These three arguments explain why the ideology might be crucial in determining
the behavior of the Polish constitutional judges, either by sincere voting or by
pondering strategic interests. Nevertheless, some limitations as to which extent
ideological goals can be advanced by judges need to be recognized. We do not
expect all decisions to be polarized and ideology or party alignment to explain all
voting. In fact, most importantly, judges might be simply dissent averse. This can be
justified by different reasons. Crucially, dissenting requires additional work (judge
needs to justify the reason of a dissenting opinion). Dissenting also leads to
difficulties in collegial relationships, which might have detrimental effects on the
workplace (Edelman et al. 2012 and Epstein et al. 2011). Additionally, in the civil
law tradition, to which Poland adheres, the emphasis is put on the consensus since
dissent is perceived as harming legitimacy (Merryman and Pe´rez-Perdomo 2007).
Excessive political and ideological division in the Court could reduce its prestige
vis-a`-vis other courts (in particular, the Supreme Court), and therefore diminish the
influence of constitutional judges over judicial ranks, and ultimately, the legal
system overall. Finally, not all cases allow the same discretion or are open to
identical ideological argumentation (there is an opportunity element to be
considered).
It is important to note that some literature rejects ideology as an explanation for
judicial behavior. The most immediate is the traditional formalist approach by
which the expectation is that judges are legalists and therefore interpret the law
without influence of political variables (Edwards and Livermore 2009). With respect
to the limited tenure at the court an alternative hypothesis can be derived to support
the limitations of the attitudinal or strategic models. The main argument goes as
follows. Politicians, contrary to what the common wisdom would suggest, are
interested in having an independent judiciary for two main reasons. It is either
because independent judiciary makes a legislation more durable (Landes and Posner
1975) or because independent courts can be used to shift blame for unpopular
political decisions (Salzberger 1993; Voigt and Salzberger 2002). According to
these arguments, after the judicial tenure, politicians should therefore reward to
larger extent judicial independence rather than political alignment (Salzberger and
Fenn 1999; Fiorino et al. 2015). If the political alignment is found in the Polish TK,
this would mean however that this alternative argument plays rather a marginal role.
Summing-up, in this paper the following approach is taken. Constitutional judges
want to advance their ideological goals, either sincerely or strategically but they are
constrained by a variety of institutional factors. When those ideological goals are
important, judges will sacrifice other considerations and make decisions according
to the most explicit party interests. We also acknowledge alternative explanations
by which ideology plays no role in judicial lawmaking.
4 Data and empirical strategy
This article applies regression analysis to a unique dataset collected and coded by
the authors. An emphasis is given to abstract judicial review of statutes, in cases
initiated by explicit political actors (i.e. the President of the Republic, 50 deputies,
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30 senators or the Presidents of Sejm and Senate) from July 2003 to October 2014.19
As already mentioned, those cases are the most politicized and particular party
interests can be easily identified.
There are several reasons to constrain the cases analyzed to the chosen period.
First, in the late 1990s, the TK went through major institutional changes (see
Sect. 2). Most importantly, only since the end of 1999, the decisions by the TK are
binding and parliamentarian supermajorities cannot reject the judgments of the
Court. It is argued that timespan until 2003 is sufficient to internalize the effect of
these reforms and stabilize the role of the TK under the new constitutional
provisions. It is of note that no major reforms of the TK were introduced or pursued
after 2003. Second, all judges adjudicating over the period 2003–2013 were chosen
after the institutional reforms of 1997. Specifically, they were part of the (new
designed) Court consisting of 15 judges and they all were chosen for a period of
9 years (with no possibility of reappointment). Third, at the beginning of 2000s one
can observe an increase in the numbers of cases petitioned by the MPs, which most
often have significant political context. For instance, while in the period 1997–2001,
the Court decided an average of two cases filed by the deputies per year; in
2002–2006 it increased to six cases yearly (Trybunał 2006).
Overall the dataset includes 73 cases, 344 decisions (issues) and 3595 individual
decisions (votes). Some caveats to these numbers are in order. First, the number of
decisions is much larger than the number of cases since a single judgment might
consist of several issues being analyzed. The reason for this is that petitioners
usually challenge numerous articles of a particular legislation. Second, although the
judges in the adjudicating benches vote on the whole judgment at once, it is
assumed that judges cast several votes depending on the number of issues comprised
in the judgment. For instance, if the judgment consists of four issues, and the
decision of the bench is that all the provisions are in conformity with the
constitution, the judge who does not present a dissenting opinion will be counted as
casting four votes for constitutionality.20 In case s/he presents a dissenting opinion
with respect to one issue, three of his/her votes are considered in favor of the
constitutionality and one against it. Lastly, specifically in the Polish TK, besides
declaring the simple and partial constitutionality or unconstitutionality of the
provision, the adjudicating bench can decide that the provision ‘is not in
unconformity’ with the constitution. This decision conveys that the control
benchmark (constitutional provision), which was proposed by the petitioner to be
the basis for judging in favor or against constitutionality of a specific article, is
19 Abstract judicial reviews of statutes are classified by the TK under two letter codes, i.e. K (ex post
abstract review) and Kp (ex ante abstract review). Due to the fact that the availability of the
documentation on the TK website is limited, it was impossible to identify petitioners in six cases, i.e. K
12/02, K 19/02, K 34/03, K 24/04, K 38/04 and K 17/12. Consequently, those cases are not part of the
dataset.
20 It is important to note that the decisions in the adjudicating benches are taken by a simple majority.
Judges vote secretly and if they do not agree with the final judgment, they are allowed to present the
dissenting opinions. In the view of this paper, the absence of the dissenting opinion indicates that a judge,
even if initially s/he voted differently than the majority, eventually s/he agrees with the decision of the
adjudicating bench.
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considered irrelevant by the Court. In this article, for sake of empirical consistency,
the view is taken as if this decision is in favor of constitutionality.
It is important to stress that among 344 decisions, unanimous decisions were an
important fraction: 222 (roughly 65 %). This could serve as a first indication of
dissent aversion and constraining effect of institutional realities in the TK. The 344
decisions which are studied can be divided into 66 decisions from July 2003 to
October 2005 (left-wing government), 106 decisions from 2005 to November 2007
(extreme right government), 172 decisions from 2007 to 2014 (centrist govern-
ment). Thus, the sample fairly represents all political cycles enabling to conclude
that the econometric results are not primarily driven by a certain particular political
context.
In the analyzed period, i.e. from July 2003 to October 2014, there have been in
total 30 judges adjudicating in constitutional cases (one judge resigned from the post
without adjudicating in any of the considered cases in our dataset). They were
mostly male and, in general, they were academically oriented. Some judges had a
political past, i.e. they were members of political parties or even served as MPs in
the parliament. From among the 30 judges, seven were appointed by the left-wing
SLD. The remaining judges were appointed by center and right-wing parties.
However, it is of note that some of the parties which nominated judges in our dataset
disappeared at some point before 2014 (Akcja Wyborcza Solidarnos´c´, hereinafter
AWS; Unia Wolnos´ci, hereinafter UW) or lost representation in the parliament
during the period we consider (Liga Polskich Rodzin, hereinafter LPR).
We employ a two-step strategy to investigate whether the TK judges are
politicized. First, by means of simple contingency analysis it will be demonstrated
how vote for or against constitutionality changes depending on whether a judge was
appointed by the party which challenges law to the TK. Second, we exploit a more
sophisticated logistic regression to verify whether a vote for or against constitu-
tionality depends on the political affiliation of the petitioner. However, the
regression analysis allows investigating also other determinants of judicial behavior
in the Polish TK. Main dependent variable and all independent variables used in the
regression analysis are summarized in Table 1.
The argument to be tested goes as follows. According to strict legal formalism,
there should be no systematic correlation between the dependent variable of interest
(vote for or against constitutionality) and political variable informing whether the
body challenging the law and the judge are associated with the same political party
(Request_align). In view of formalism, the constitutional disputes should be
resolved in light of facts of the case and precedents with respect to the plain
meaning of the constitution and intent of its drafters. Decision for or against
constitutionality should not therefore depend on the fact that body challenging the
law and the judge are associated with the same political party. In a formalist model,
a coefficient of the Request_align should not be statistically significant. A similar
conclusion emerges when we consider alternative explanations that reject ideology
as a determinant as explained in the previous section.
In line with the attitudinal and the strategic models that propose ideology as the
factor shaping judicial behavior, the prediction is that variable capturing ideology
should be statistically significant. Regarding the variable Request_align, it is
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Table 1 Variables used in regression analysis and their descriptive statistics
Variables Description N Mean Standard
deviation
Min Max
Constitutionality 1 If decision for constitutionality,
0 otherwise
3595 0.565 0.496 0 1
Request_align 1 If the party of the judge
requested the judicial review, 0
otherwise
3595 0.276 0.447 0 1
Government_align 1 If the party of the judge is in the
government, 0 otherwise
3595 0.329 0.470 0 1
Gender 1 If the judge is female, 0
otherwise
3595 0.231 0.422 0 1
Professor 1 If the judge pursued an
academic career, 0 otherwise
3595 0.775 0.418 0 1
Political involvement 1 If the judge was politically
involved in the past, 0
otherwise
3595 0.403 0.491 0 1
PO 1 If the judge was nominated by
PO, 0 otherwise
3595 0.152 0.359 0 1
SLD 1 If the judge was nominated by
SLD, 0 otherwise
3595 0.301 0.459 0 1
PiS 1 If the judge was nominated by
PiS, 0 otherwise
3595 0.230 0.421 0 1
LPR 1 If the judge was nominated by
LPR, 0 otherwise
3595 0.0459 0.209 0 1
PSL If the judge was nominated by
PSL; 0 otherwise
3595 0.0214 0.145 0 1
AWS/UW If the judge was nominated by
AWS or UW, 0 otherwise (due
to the inclusion of the constant
term, this category does not
appear in the regressions, i.e.
serves as a baseline category)
3595 0.249 0.432 0 1
Age The age of the judge at the time of
appointment
3595 57.00 7.007 36 70
Chair 1 If the judge is a chairman in the
adjudicating bench, 0 otherwise
3595 0.0957 0.294 0 1
Rapporteur 1 If the judge is a rapporteur in the
adjudicating bench, 0 otherwise
3595 0.135 0.342 0 1
Big bench 1 If the decision was taken by a
big bench (i.e. minimum 9
judges), 0 otherwise
3595 0.857 0.350 0 1
Unanimity 1 If the decision was without
dissenting opinion, 0 otherwise
3595 0.597 0.491 0 1
Fiscal Cases on fiscal matters 3595 0.178 0.383 0 1
Social Cases on social matters 3595 0.308 0.462 0 1
Labour Cases on labor matters 3595 0.00974 0.0982 0 1
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expected therefore that the vote for constitutionality is less likely when the law is
challenged by the party that nominated the judge. In the cases analyzed in this
paper, the petitioner, who challenged the law, always claimed its unconstitution-
ality. Consequently, it is anticipated that the coefficient of Request_align variable
should be negative.
5 A preliminary quantitative exploration
The preliminary exploration starts by looking at simple conditional probabilities of
voting for and against constitutionality. In the first step, the whole 3595 individual
votes are divided into those for constitutionality (56.5 %) and those against
constitutionality (43.5 %), in reference to the 344 decisions advanced by the Court.
In the second step, it was identified whether the petitioners (i.e. the group of
deputies, the President of the Republic or the President of the Sejm) represent the
party which nominated a particular judge. Recall that a petitioner challenges the law
and claims its unconstitutionality. Overall, Table 2 shows that a vote against
constitutionality is slightly more likely when the petitioner and the judge are of the
same party (55.1 %) as compared to the situation where the petitioner is associated
with a different party (39.1 %) using our measure of party alignment. Similarly, the
vote for constitutionality is more probable when the petitioner and the judge are
from different parties (60.9 %) than when they are associated with the same parties
(44.9 %).
Table 1 continued
Variables Description N Mean Standard
deviation
Min Max
Construction/transport Cases on construction and
transportation matters
3595 0.0615 0.240 0 1
Financial/business Cases on financial or business
matters
3595 0.0378 0.191 0 1
Voting law Cases on voting, administration,
political parties’ matters
3595 0.198 0.399 0 1
Table 2 Voting for constitutionality (all decisions)
Vote against
constitutionality
Vote for
constitutionality
Total
A petitioner associated with the same
party as judge
546 (55.1 %) 445 (44.9 %) 991 (27.6 %)
A petitioner associated with a different
party
1017 (39.1 %) 1587 (60.9 %) 2604 (72.4 %)
Total 1563 (43.5 %) 2032 (56.5 %) 3595 (100 %)
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It is important to stress that the dataset includes the cases filed by Presidents
Aleksander Kwas´niewski (left of center) and Bronisław Komorowski (centrist
party), who occasionally challenged laws issued by parties from which they
politically originated. In that situation, however, judges might be addressing a
conflict of interest between two political bodies with the same political preferences.
Thus, a vote for constitutionality does not necessary show that the judge goes
against her/his ideological background. Similarly, a vote for unconstitutionality
does not need to indicate straight ideological alignment. Table 3 introduces
conditional probabilities where petitions by Presidents Kwas´niewski and Komor-
owski are excluded. To a large extent, the results are fairly similar.
Table 4 depicts an additional contingency analysis for nonunanimous decisions
(122 decisions). The voting patterns for and against constitutionality seem to be
even stronger associated with the background of petitioner. A vote against
constitutionality is much more likely when the petitioner and the judge are of the
same party (66.7 %) as compared to the situation where the petitioner is associated
with a different party (38.9 %). Similarly, the vote for constitutionality is more
probable when the petitioner and the judge are from different parties (63.6 %) than
when they are associated with the same parties (45.5 %).
Another way of illustrating a potential ideological bias is by showing the votes
for and against constitutionality distributed among judges nominated by different
political camps when they are faced with cases filed by the SLD (left of center) and
PiS (extreme right), i.e. parties considered having the largest ideological disparity.
The distribution of votes by judges representing the main political parties (SLD—
left of center, PO—center, PiS—extreme right) is shown in Table 5. It can be
observed from the table that judges appointed by SLD (left of center) are more
likely to vote against constitutionality in cases where the petitioner is associated
with SLD. The results are reversed, i.e. SLD judges tend to vote for constitution-
ality, when the case is filed by PiS (extreme right). Also PiS judges differ in their
voting patterns when faced with PiS (more probable vote against constitutionality)
and SLD petitioners (more probable vote for constitutionality). PO judges, in turn,
are much more likely to vote for constitutionality in cases challenged by both SLD
(left of center) and PiS (extreme right). However, a low number of observations for
PO judges, when petitioner is associated with SLD, should be acknowledged.
Table 3 Voting for constitutionality (cases filed by Presidents Kwas´niewski and Komorowski are
excluded)
Vote against
constitutionality
Vote for
constitutionality
Total
A petitioner associated with the same
party as judge
446 (54.5 %) 373 (45.5 %) 819 (25.5 %)
A petitioner associated with a different
party
873 (36.4 %) 1523 (63.6 %) 2396 (74.5 %)
Total 1319 (41.0 %) 1896 (59.0 %) 3215 (100 %)
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This contingency analysis suggests that, even though a significant number of
decisions are unanimous, there is preliminary evidence to support the conjecture
that, in general, judges seem to respond (sincerely or strategically) to the identity of
the petitioner. Notice, however, that the numbers also indicate that the political
response to the petitioners varies somehow across parties. While SLD and PiS
judges seem quite sensitive to petitioner being aligned with them or the opposing
party, PO judges do not vary significantly in their behavior when exposed to SLD or
PiS petitioners. One possible explanation is that PO judges are less polarized
because they are politically centrist and more compromising in ideological terms.
6 Regression analysis
In order to test more robustly the conjecture that judges vote in accordance with
their ideological stance, a more sophisticated regression exercise is employed. A set
of logistic regressions is presented to support the above preliminary results, and
further investigate determinants of judicial behavior in the Polish TK. A dummy
dependent variable, i.e. vote for constitutionality, takes value one when a judge
votes for constitutionality and zero otherwise. All independent variables, along the
main variable of interest – Request_align, are presented in Table 1.
It is of note that several fixed effects per judge and per court were included in the
explanatory variables set as well. Usually with these types of regression, one should
consider the signal and not put too much emphasis on the magnitude in the
Table 4 Voting for constitutionality (only nonunanimous decisions)
Vote against
constitutionality
Vote for
constitutionality
Total
A petitioner associated with the same
party as judge
294 (66.7 %) 147 (33.3 %) 441 (30.4 %)
A petitioner associated with a different
party
392 (38.9 %) 616 (61.1 %) 1008 (69.6 %)
Total 686 (47.3 %) 763 (52.7 %) 1449 (100 %)
Table 5 Vote for constitutionality after identifying petitioners and party nominations (all decisions)
SLD petitioner (left of center) PiS petitioner (extreme right)
Unconstitutional Constitutional Unconstitutional Constitutional
Judges appointed by SLD (left of
center)
361 (56.8 %) 275 (43.2 %) 83 (34.9 %) 155 (65.1 %)
Judges appointed by PO (center) 16 (39.0 %) 25 (61.0 %) 103 (26.4 %) 287 (73.6 %)
Judges appointed by PiS
(extreme right)
127 (28.1 %) 325 (71.9 %) 162 (52.1 %) 149 (47.9 %)
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estimated coefficients. Although the purpose is mainly to assess qualitatively the
impact of explanatory variables on the probability of a judge voting for
constitutionality, the marginal effects for main explanatory variables are also
presented. Due to the non-independence of votes within cases and decisions (recall
that each case might encompass more than one decision), the appropriate logit
models with clustering by case and by decision are applied. Several logit regressions
with clustering by decisions are produced in Table 6.
The regression analysis largely confirms the preliminary analysis of the dataset.
The influence of the ideologies and party politics seem to matter. As expected,
coefficient for Request_align variable has a negative sign and is robust for any
specification. Particularly, the results are robust for selected subsamples dataset and
irrespective of clustering by decisions (Table 6) or by cases (available upon
request). This strongly supports the view that constitutional judges respond to the
interests of political bodies. Overall, the probability that a judge will vote for
constitutionality decreases when the judge’s party requests the judicial review.
Depending on the sample, the marginal effects vary from 18 to 38 %. Thus, the
probability of voting for constitutionality decreases by 18–38 %, if the judge is
associated with the party which challenges the law.
In addition, one can observe that a robust pattern of statistical significance is
present in case of age and certain party affiliations variables. Some systematic
patterns can also be noticed for variables representing specific functions of the
judges in the adjudicating bench, i.e. rapporteur or chairman. The same is noticed
for the unanimity over the case and specific laws. As to other variables, the vote for
constitutionality seems to be random and unexplained by them.
The fact that unanimity significantly increases the likelihood of voting for
constitutionality demonstrates that the peer pressure may indeed have some
influence on the adjudicating pattern. Institutional constraints may also be reflected
through other variables. For instance, the fact that a judge is in charge of drafting the
majority opinion (rapporteur) or chairs the adjudicating bench increases the
probability of declaring that the law is in conformity with the constitution. Thus, it
could be inferred that those judges who hold some functions in the adjudicating
benches exert stronger presumption of the constitutionality. Interestingly, the
presumption of the constitutionality seems to be stronger also for older judges who,
consequently, might be less responsive to parties’ interests. For instance, they might
not expect further appointment after serving in the Court.
Overall, party affiliation plays an important role in explaining the behavior of the
Polish TK judges but with some limitations given the institutional realties in the TK.
Therefore, not a simple attitudinal model is proposed but an adjusted model where
the advancement of ideological goals coincides with limitations imposed by
institutional realities of the TK. The econometric results provide support for this
approach.
An alternative way to identify the ideological bias in the court could be by
employing interaction terms between the variables concerning which party
appointed the judge and whether the petitioner is, for instance, a left wing party.
The interpretation is that a judge appointed by a given party and confronted with a
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petition filed by the left-wingers is less (if appointed by the left-wing camp) or more
(if appointed by the other political camps) likely to vote for constitutionality.
Due to the limited number of observations where PO (center), LPR and PSL
judges voted on cases filed by SLD (left of center), the interaction terms for them
are dropped. As a result, two interaction terms are considered for two most
ideologically polarized parties, i.e. SLD (left of center) and PiS (extreme right). If
the hypothesis of ideological alignment holds, then the judge appointed by SLD (left
of center) should help SLD petitioners (vote against constitutionality) while the
opposite should happen for the judges appointed by PiS (vote for constitutionality).
Hence, for the interaction term with appointments by SLD (left of center) one
should expect a negative coefficient whereas for appointments by PiS (extreme
right), one should anticipate a positive coefficient. Table 7 contains the several logit
regressions with clustering by decisions.
As seen from Table 7, the interaction terms of interest are highly statistically
significant in all specifications. They have the expected signs, which are in line with
the ideological bias and party alignment of the judges. Thus, whenever a judge
appointed by SLD (left of center) is confronted with a case filed by SLD, it is less
probable that s/he votes for constitutionality. The marginal effects of interaction
‘‘SLD*law challenged by SLD’’ range between 14 and 63 %. That means that a vote
for constitutionality drops by 14–63 % when a judge associated with SLD
adjudicates in cases filed by SLD (the large marginal effects are observed for
regressions on sample of nonunanimous decisions). In contrast, the judges
nominated by PiS (extreme right) are more likely to vote for the constitutionality
when facing a law challenged by the SLD (left of center). The marginal effects vary
between 26 and 48 %. That indicates that the vote for constitutionality increases by
26–48 % when a judge associated with PiS adjudicates in cases petitioned by SLD.
The conclusion seems to be that the TK judges cast ideological bias in the direction
of the parties which nominated them. This is in particular for judges nominated by
the two most polarized political parties.
Similarly to previous regressions, also other variables are statistically robust.
Once again institutional constraints seem to play a role. In particular, the fact that
the judge is in charge of drafting the Court’s judgment (rapporteur) or chairs the
adjudicating bench increases the likelihood of voting in favor of constitutionality.
Also unanimous decisions are associated (although weakly) with voting in
conformity with the constitution, which indicates some peer pressure in the court.
Additionally, statistical significance is observed for party affiliation (SLD, left of
center), some specific laws, age at the appointment and political involvement of the
judges. Other variables do not seem to have a robust pattern of statistical
significance.
7 Conclusion
The empirical results presented in this paper seem to support some version of the
attitudinal and strategic models. It is to say that judicial behavior is influenced by
the ideology, either because judges’ preferences coincide with the interests of a
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specific party or because the judges are incentivized to show their loyalty to a party.
Party alignment exists but subject to some important institutional influences. There
is, therefore, little evidence to support the hypothesis of formalist behavior in the
Constitutional Court as advocated by traditional legal scholars. These results are in
line with previous findings for the constitutional courts, i.e. evidence from France,
Italy, Portugal and Spain.
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